A week ago, state population totals from the Census Bureau’s annual population estimates were released, the first data covering population changes following the controversial Dobbs v. Jackson Supreme Court Decision.
Before any conclusions are drawn, it is crucial to note the inherent margin of error found in all, and between all, population estimates. Any extrapolation, let alone one from over six years before actual census data is tabulated, has significant room for error and uncertainty that must underscore any discussion of the data and the conclusions thence derived. It is similarly important to understand that margins of error, by definition, can cause bidirectional deviations between and within estimates. True population changes could be greater or lower than what any estimate suggests, and measured change between estimates can similarly vary.
Breaking down state-level population by partisan control gives a basic heuristic for identifying the party which can be expected to gain power in the next redistricting cycle. This is the most general political application for population distribution data. For this review, party control will be assigned by the composition of the governments most recently elected into power, after the 2022 elections.
Since the 2020 Census, the nation has grown by a historically-sluggish 1.05%, due to increased deaths during and after the pandemic, low birthrates, and decreased immigration. But this picture isn’t equivalent across states by partisan control: GOP trifecta states grew by 3.03% since the 2020 Census, compared to a 0.89% shrinkage in Democratic trifecta states, and a above-average 1.25% growth in states with split control. Most of this divergence was driven by internal migration, with 2.59 million new residents entering GOP trifecta states and 391 thousand entering states with split governments, resulting in loss of 2.98 million from states with Democratic trifectas. This relative loss was alleviated by international migration, which added 1.00 million to red states, 1.17 million to blue states (reducing population loss), and 359,000 to purple states.
Interestingly, natural population change (births subtracted by deaths) benefitted states with a Democratic trifecta the most, with those states gaining 589,000 to Republican trifecta states’ 326,000, and split-control states’ 900 person-increase. This can be attributed to comparatively higher death rates in states with a GOP trifecta spanning from mid-2020 to mid-2022, which will be expanded upon in the next section.
Perhaps one cause for particular interest for this year’s dataset is its inclusion of population changes following the overturn of Roe v. Wade in mid-2022. A theory following the Dobbs SCOTUS ruling was that states with restrictions on abortion may suffer a loss in population from residents not aligned with such priorities; that is, liberals who tend to be better-educated and employed in the professional world. A sister theory proposed that there would be more births in states where abortion was banned, as some women who would have otherwise sought the procedure would ultimately now have to carry their children to term, as legal and physical barriers were enforced.
The population-related effects of this decision can be examined by grouping the United States into three tranches based on abortion legality based off of a Planned Parenthood resource: where abortion has been eliminated, where abortion is “accessible”, and where local policy remains somewhere in between. Because of partisan polarization on the issue of abortion, the population changes overlap with partisan control of states with some differences.
For the purpose of this portion of our analysis, only data from the July 1st, 2022 and July 1st, 2023 period will be examined, covering only the span of time where the consequences of the Dobbs decision materialized. Overall, states with abortion bans actually grew by 0.91%, compared to intermediate states, which grew by 0.74%, and states with accessible abortion, which shrank by 0.01%.
In terms of natural population change, it was actually about the same in states with unobstructed access to abortion (+0.20%) and in states with the most stringent restrictions (+0.21%). Looking at the components of this natural population change shows that although the states with the most restrictions saw a birthrate of 1.21% vs. 1.05% for the least restrictive states, they had a higher death rate at 1.00% vs. 0.85%, respectively.
Comparing these figures to those of the 2021–22 period is also interesting. Birth rates for each group went down in the 2022–23 period, but natural population change climbed up more for the more restrictive states (from 0.09% to 0.21% versus 0.15% to 0.20%). This can be attributed to a decline in the death rate, which went from 1.13% to 1.00% for the most restrictive states and 0.91% to 0.85% for the least restrictive. This is likely due to the COVID pandemic subsiding, which impacted states with more vaccine skeptics to a greater extent. Undoubtedly, though, some of this increase is due to an increase in births by mothers who would have otherwise sought an abortion in states where the practice is illegal or access is otherwise obstructed. Birth rates dipped from 1.22% to 1.21% for states with abortion bans, but even in states with the most access to abortion, this figure showed a similar change, from 1.07% to 1.05%.
Unsurprisingly, given that natural population isn’t driving relative population growth in states with restrictive abortion policies, the true source of their growth is in migration. In 2023, abortion-banning states increased their size by 0.70% through migration, while states with the easiest access to abortion actually shrunk by 0.21% on this front, due to internal population loss to states with stronger restrictions on abortion.
It’s also important to compare the migration figure to previous cycles. It seems that domestic migration is slowing down from its peak around the 2020–22 periods, when about a net 880,000 residents left abortion-friendly states annually for other states. A smaller, but still disastrous net 724,000 Americans migrated out of these states in the 2022–23 period, which marginally reduced the population loss compared to previous years. However, domestic migration into abortion-banning states remains strong, with 339,000 net domestic migrants entering such states in the 2022–23 period compared to an average 376,000 pre-Dobbs. In fact, most of the decrease in migration comes from states with a moderate policy on abortion which were gaining 503,000 annually, down to 386,000 in the 2022–23 period.
These data points primarily suggest that the population-related impact of the landscape-altering Dobbs decision has (perhaps surprisingly) not been statistically significant just yet, with relatively minor numerical changes to American vital statistics and migration patterns resulting from what was a landmark Supreme Court decision. This conclusion should not be understood to minimize the real, personal effects of that development, but rather as a quantitative confirmation of the limited domain some dimensions of politics have on the often pocketbook-driven decision to move across state lines.
The combination of greater migration from blue to red states combined with a higher death rate in those states (as explored under the natural population change analysis by abortion legality) suggest that the overall present population trend is that a disproportionately-elderly group of Americans are seeking conservative southern states for their lower cost-of-living and warmer weather. However, the fact that Republican states continue to grow despite this disproportionately vulnerable composition (which has been following this pattern for decades) also suggests that these newcomers are greater in number than in previous years, and that they also include younger adults and their families, constituting a more sustainable, permanent population growth. This means that such increases most likely are long-term, affecting the redistricting process for decades to come.
In part two, we’ll examine the impact that these migration-related changes may have, and may already have had, on congressional reapportionment, and redistricting.
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